HS2 reset

Featured in the Future Transport London Newsletter July 2026

By Andrew Bosi

The High Speed 2 railway rivals Sir Keir Starmer for the number of resets yet it clings on to its existence albeit in a truncated form.

The latest announcement by the Secretary of State for Transport followed the publication of the Lovegrove report into what went wrong, and some interim recommendations from Mark Wild’s on-going review of how the project should be reset. The Lovegrove report is useful because it finally nails the lie, repeated by one of the consultants who appears to have derived most of his income from HS2 over more than a decade, that the project has always been about capacity. It was designed for high speed, hence the name, in fact for higher speeds than anywhere in Europe.

It should have been amended when increasing capacity became its purpose. As Mark Wild has previously acknowledged in evidence to the GLA Transport Committee, Crossrail was able to control costs by minor adjustments to its route, thereby avoiding the need to demolish buildings and reduce the need or the level of compensation.

HS2 has incurred all the extra cost that goes with adherence to a rigidly straight line. One of the interim recommendations is to reduce the speed – too late for the construction savings, but justified by a reduction in the cost of testing the new trains.

Mark Wild is very clear about a significant cause of the cost over-run: that contracts were let before the scope of the project was fully developed. He has not, however, addressed the issue of why contracts were let in a hurry. He is keen to assure us that there are many good people at HS2, no doubt because as CEO he has to work with them. Many of the ‘good people’ were the whistle blowers who were sacked for their pains by bad people.  Vested interests in the scheme sought to bulldoze Parliament by entering commitments which could then be used to persuade ministers that the cost of pulling the scheme made that prohibitive. As Simon Jenkins writes in the Guardian, there is too much emphasis on ‘sunk costs’ and the concept of throwing good money after bad seems to have escaped successive ministers.

The cost of compensating those who lost their homes and livelihoods was deliberately understated.  Bernadette Kelly, the civil servant chiefly responsible at the Department of Transport, admitted that the knowledge that £55.7bn (2015 prices) was unrealistically short of the true cost was with-held from Parliament in order not to scare MPs into rejecting the legislation to permit the scheme.

What about Euston?

Questions remain over the approaches to Euston and the nature of the station at the end of them.  Frequent references to the tunnelling now in progress from Old Oak Common are to ‘Euston’. The tunnels only extend as far as Parkway and there is still no agreed scheme for the route from there to Euston. The ‘Birdcage’ which was put forward in the Act has long been abandoned.  Designs for the station have been twice revised and the number of platforms reduced from 11 to 10 and then 6, but there is still a lobby for passive provision for three more platforms at a later date. The revisions were prompted by a desire to reduce costs, but costs are rising as fast as the number of platforms falls.

What should be done to escape this never ending saga?  It has been reported that the government again looked at the option of pulling the plug. HS2 Limited may consistently under-estimate the cost of the project, but have no problem in finding costs that would arise if the whole thing were cancelled. What has not been considered is the option of repurposing what has already been built. Now that the scheme no longer reaches Manchester and Leeds, its cost:benefit ratio is so poor that operating it would be a further and long-term drain on resources. There are already competing services between London and Birmingham, with better connections to onward destinations.  (Curzon Street was chosen to avoid existing lines: it was put forward that this would obviate the need to disrupt existing services during construction.  The West Coast Main Line upgrade had involved years of weekend disruption for minimal benefit, and criticism of it underscored thinking on HS2). On the other hand, a link from the Elizabeth line to East-West rail would offer something new. East-West Rail, from Cambridge to Oxford, is a firm commitment. A station where HS2 crosses the line would open up new links, and would afford the opportunity for a genuine new town.  Too many of the new towns under consideration are extensions of existing towns and cities; this would better meet the government’s aspirations.

As Mark Wild continues to work on the reset, lateral thinking outside the box from experts without a personal interest in the outcome is what is needed.

Andrew Bosi